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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

:3TATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 17512
Vs.

Hl

'"~i'.RD

NEWMEYER,

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with the crimes of rape and forcible
sc,Clorry,

in violation of Sections 76-5-402 and 76-5-403, Utah Code

i'-.n,-.otated, 1953, as amended,

in that on or about August 29, 1980,

at Utah County, Utah, the Defendant had sexual intercourse with
a female not his wife, MARIE ELLEN MARTIN, without her consent, a
felony of the second degree, and that the Defendant performed a
sexual act upon the same female, by the use of his sexual organ
in the mouth of said female without her consent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried in the Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah County, the Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge, on the 20th of
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November,

1980, before a jury, which jury brought back a

finding the Defendanl guilty as charged on both counts.
Defendant was sentenced by the Court on December 12, 1980, to
serve 1-15 years and 5 to life in the Utah State Prison.

Notke

o: Appeal was timely filed by Appellant.
RELI~~_SOUGHT

Appellant

respecti~ely

ON APPEAL

requests that the Court vacate the

ntered in the District rourt an<'l remand the case witr.

Judgment

0

a~

granting the Defendant a new

o~der

~rial

in this matter.

BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the 29th of August,

1980, the Defendant, HOWARD NEWMEYER,

made contact with MARIE ELLEN MARTIN,
in this case.
Utah.

the Complaining witness

She was a clerk at the 7-11 Store in Lindon,

MRS. MARTIN, although married, agreed to accompany the

Defendant to his house after she got off work sometime after
11:00 PM that night,

(R., 30).

Their association that night led

to an act of sexual intercourse between them.
that the

Defendant asserts

inte::course occurred as a result of mutual consent, al-

though MRS. M1'.RTIN says she was raped.

MRS. MARTIN returned to

her home later that night and failed to report or discuss this
incident with her husband.

She again failed to discuss the prior

-2--
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r

,,,rJht's occurrances with her husband the next morning when he
JP ft for work,

(R. ,49).

That afternoon ritter discussions with

friends they reported the incident to the police, and the DefPnc1ant was arrested,

(R., 78).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY QUESTIONED THE DEFENDANT'S
TESTIMONY SO AS TO GIVE THE JURY THE CLEAR IMPRESSION
THAT THE JUDGE DISBELIEVED THE DEFENDANT.
Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah provides in part: " ... No persons shall be barred from
orosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State
The Court has made the following statement in reference to the
above cited section of the Constitution:
In addition to the important right to have access
to the Courts, it is equally important that the
Court be fair and impartial, committed to the
purpose of seeking truth and doing justice, without bias or prejudice, fear or favor. In pursuing
that objective, it is not to be questioned that,
particularly in a jury trial, a Judge should maintain an attitude of neutrallty and should not,
either by his comments or demeanor indicate his opinions either as to the credibility of the evidence
or on the disputed issues of fact. Consistent with
the foregoing, the Judge should and normally does exersise restraint in examining witnesses, so that he
does not unduly intrude into the trial or encroach

-3-
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upon the functions of coun:cel, (Bmphasis .l'Hided).
State vs. Mellen, 'i31 P.2d 46, 4R.
Althouqh a Judge is not required to sit silently in
maintaining the appropriate attitude of neutrality, he should
also refrain from openly espousing the position of the Plaintiff
or Defendant in the case before him.

The Court's exclusive

prerogative is to decide the law in each case, and not to argue
factual matters on behalf of either Party before him.
Annotated,

Utah Code

1953, Section 77-17-10, as amended, provides:

(1)
In a jury trial, questions of law are to be
determined by the Court, questions of fact by the
jury.
(2)
The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as well as fact but they
are bound to follow the law as stated by the Court.
Judges are pr:ohibi ted from deciding issues of fact in a jur;·
er ial, and it is inappropriate for a trial judge to give a jury
e~en

subtle indications as to whether evidence which has been

presented is believable or not.

999

In State vs. Rosenbaum 449 P.2c

(Utah, 1969), this Court reversed the Defendant's

convictio~

of burglary holding that the trial court had committed
prejudicial error by giving the jury an instruction disparaging
the Defendant's alibi defense.

The Court said:

In this State the trial Judge is not permitted to
comment on evidence and he, therefore, may not
indicate to a jury that evidence is either weak or
convincing.
It is the sole and exclusive province

-4-
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of the jury to
case, and this
ative strength
case. 449 P. 2d

determine the facts in a criminal
it must do regardless of the relor weakness of the evidence in the
at 1000.

It is clear that a trial Judge may not in any way indicate
to the members of a jury whether or not he personally believes or
discredits whatever evidence is being presented.

Certainly

Judges have their personal opinions and beliefs, as does any
person,

but Judges have a special duty not to communicate their

po,rsonal beliefs to the members of the jury in any possible way.
If a trial Judge does project the attitude of belief or disbelief
a~ring

a witnesses testimony, the jury may be improperly

influenced by the Judge's opinion.

If a jury is influenced by a

Co1Jrt's expression or communication of belief or disbelief, the
Court has invaded the province of the jury to evaluate the
evidence.
The record discloses that the Prosecution based part
of its proof of "force" on behalf of the Defendant by introducing
State's exhibit i4, a knife.

(R. ,105) The prosecution focused

its questioning of the Defendant on this knife ( R.,141, 142)
inferring that the Complaining witness would never have seen the
kdfe had the Defendant not used it to threaten her.

After the

prosecution and defense had both questioned the Defendant at
length,

the Court began cross-examining the Defendant.

(R.,154,

155) The trial court began following a line of questioning which
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the Prosecutor had already completed, regarding the location Cf
State's exhibit !14, the knife.

At the very least the Court's

questions were repetitive on a subject matter which had clear!
already been covered by the Prosecution.

However the Judge's

demeanor became extremely skeptical arid disbelieving, culminat:·
in his question:

"How do you account for the fact she told the

Officers tf-ie next day wrat kind of a knif": it was?"

(R. ,155)

Tf·

attitude of the trial Junge, the edge on his voice, and his
skeptical expression all communicated a clear disblief and
dissatisfation with the Defendant's answer.

It became so

obviously prejudicial that the prosecution hurriedly interruptec
the Court and again resumed his recross-examination on another
topic.

But by this time members of the jury, the Prosecutor an;

Defense counsel, and spectators in the court room were

looki~·

one another and at the trial judge quizzically, wondering what
had prompted such an open display of disbelief on his part.
The actions by the trial court gave those persons present,
including members of the jury, every indication as to what the
Judge thought of the testimony of the Defendant: he totally
disbelieved it.

This invades the province of the jury, whose

-6-
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prerogative it is to evaluate the evidence presented.

Such

behavior on the part of the trial Judge was in effect a comment
on his behalf to the jury that they need not believe the
Defendant's testimony any more than he did.

This is clearly

impermissitle and certainly prejudicial to the Defendant.
In State vs. St. Clair 301 P. 2d 752

(Utah, 1956) the Supreme

Court affirmed the trial court's conviction of the Defendant for
111uriJer.

At trial evidence was presented by the Prosecution that

the Defendant had cut a backdoor screen with his pocketknife to
yain entry to the house where he allegedly killed a woman.

In

response to this testimony the trial Judge made a comment which
questioned the Prosecution's interpretation of the markings or
lack of markings on the screen door and on the pocketknife.

How-

ever the Supreme Court was unable to see how this judicial
comment of the evidence, although improper, was prejudicial to
t~e

Defendant, since the Court's statement questioned the

Prosecution's evidence.
Ho~ever

Therefore the conviction was upheld.

in the case at bar the comments of the trial judge were

directed to the testimony of the Defendant himself, and the
incredulous demeanor adopted by the trial Judge was directed
specifically at the Defendant's explanation.

-7-
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In State vs_._Str:ob_r!_l 456 P.2d 170

(Utah,

1969)

this c 0 urt

reversed the Defendant's conviction on burglary and larceny anr.
remanded for a new trial.

After voir dire there was some

quC?stion about the voluntariness of a confession, and the trial
court announced in front of the jury that this was a question f·
the jury.

The Supreme Court held this constituted error, becau,.

the question was in fact one for the Judge.

The judgment was

reversed and remanded for a new trial because the court had

i~

properly instructed the jury to perform a function which was
within the province of the trial Judge.

The Judge had

effectivly abrogatec his responsibility to desioe the question,
In the case at bar the guilty verdicts should be reversed because the trial Judge overstepped the bounds of his
res;:ionsibilities, and invaded the province of the jury.

By iIT.-

properly indicating to the jury his strong disbelief of the De'.·
end ant's testimony,

the trial court was improperly influencing

the jury in it's duties as a finder of fact.

Defense counsel

moved for a mistrial on the basis of the Court's prejudicial
behavior, which motion was denied.

(R., 157, 158)

Even though the trial court's actions were improper, they
constitute reversible error only when they are found to be prejudicial to the rights of the Defendant in obtaining a fair

-8-
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trial. State vs. Archuletta 501 P. 2d 263

(Utah, 1972).

Def-

cc,,,'ant respectfully submits that the actions of the trail court
:~~uw

amounted to an abuse of discretion which substantially pre-

ju'ic0d the Defendant's right to a fair trial, and his conviction
i~

that court should therefore be reversed, and the Defendant
nted a new trial.

POINT II
STATEMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR TO THE JURY DURING
CLOS ING ARGUMENT THAT THE JURY HAD A DUTY REGARDING
THE VICTIM IN RETURNING THEIR VERDICT TAINTED OR
REMOVED THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF DEFENDANT.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 76-1-501, provides in
(1)
A Defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of
the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the absence of such
proof, the Defendant shall be acquited.
Since it is the Defendant on trial in a criminal proceeding
it is his rights which are effected by the outcome of the trial.
T~e State
~rcof

has the burden to present evidence and the burden of

showing Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

A

criminal proceeding is not a balancing of interests between the
victim of a crime and the alleged perpetrator thereof.

The State

-9-
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acts on behalf of all of its ci+-izens in pres<"r'Jing their rig'':
including the rights of the citizen charged with the crime.
very essence of such r iqhts is the presumption of innocence, ar
this presumption extends to every person until their guilt is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Utah,

State vs. Mannion 57 P. 542

1899) State vs. Topham 123 P. 888

(Utah, 1912).

Any

statement by the Prosecution which in any way alters the State':
burden as regards the Defendant's presumption of innocence is
improper. At the trial

~elow

the Prosecution made a state-

ment during closing argument to the effect that the jury had a
duty in comming to its verdict to consider the rights of the
victim of this crime.

This statement was not transcribed and

therefore does not appear
counsel for

in the record of the trial.

Howevec

the defense objected to the same and moved for a

mistrial, which motion ths court below denied.

(R., 157, 158)

0

'•

court below made no attempt to rehabilitate the jury or to
discount the comments made by the Prosecutor.
Certainly both the prosecution and the defense are entitle!
to characterize the case in the light most favorable to
themselves.

But this does not include statements to the jury

whl.ch could possibly shift the burden of proof from the State to
the Defendant.

In State vs. Valdez 513 P.2d 422

(Utah, 1973) t\;
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sur,reme Court affirmed the conviction of the Defendant for
inurcler, in spite of some allegedly
the prosecutor.

prejudicial remarks made by

The Court stated:

Counsel for both sides have considerable latitude
in their arguments to the jury; they have the
to discuss fully from their standpoints the
evidence and the inferences and deductions
arising therefrom. The test whether the remarks
made by counsel are so objectionable as to
merit a reversal in a criminal case is, did the
remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and were
they, under the circumstances of the particular
case orobably influenced by those remarks. The
determination of whether the improper remarks
have influenced a verdict is within the sound
discretion of the trial court on motion for a new
trial.
If there is no abuse of this discretion
and substantial justice appears to have been done,
the appellate court will not reverse the judgment.
(Emphasis added) 513 P.2d 426.
Defendant here contends that the statements of the
Prosecutor during argument at trial below called the attention of
the jury to matters which they were not justified in considering
when coming to their verdict.

And because of the delicate

nature of a case such as this, where the entire issue is that of
consent, the slightest tipping of the balance could have
influenced the jury either way.

Because of the conviction of the

Defendant on both counts, it can be assummed that the jury was
probably influenced by those remarks of the Prosecutor to the
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sympathy of the jury.
ex~min1ng

This combined with improper cross-

of the Defendant by the trial court below, amounts

to ?n abuse of discreti0n by the trial court.

Where the facts

are as tenuous as the ones etablished at trial below, and the
trial judge and Prosecutor have both made improper statements,
Defendant's conviction below resulted from prejudicial
circumstances which denied him substantial justice.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE JURY RENDERED
A GUILTY VERDICT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE CONVICTIONS FOR RAPE AND FORCIBLE SODOMY.
A. The evidence presented at trial below was
so inherently improbable under the circumstances that reasonable persons, in the absence of the errors committed, could not have
convicted the Defendant.
In State vs. Horne 364 P.2d 109

(Utah, 1961)

this court

reversed the Defendant's conviction of forcible rape.

In that

case as in the case at bar, the issue of intercourse was not
disputed by either side, rather it was a question of consent.
Th~

court found it significant that the Complaining witness

made no outcry over a three hour period when the Defendant was
in her bedroom, despite the fact that she lived in a trailer
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house within twenty or thirty feet of other trailers.

Evidence

also failed to established that the Complaining witness made any
attempt to escape, although she apparently had opportunity to do
so.

Her clothing showed only limited evidence of a possible

struggle, and instead of reporting the incident immediately to
the Police, she waited all the next day and into the evening
before calling for assistance.

Noting that the old rule of

"resistance to the upmost" was obsolete and no longer applicable,
the court stated:
However, in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence, there must be considered the ease of
assertion of the forcible accomplishment of the
sexual act, with the impossibility of defense
except by direct denial, or of the proneness of
the woman, when she finds the fact of her discrace
discovered or likely of discovery to minimize her
fault by asserting force or violence, which had
led courts to hold to a very strict rule of proof
in such (rape) cases ...• We have carefully evaluated
the testimony of the prosecutrix and conclude it is
so inherently improbable as to be unworthy of be1 ief and that, upon objective analysis, it appears
that reasonable minds could not believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty. The
jury's verdict cannot stand.
Reversed. (Emphasis
Added) 364 P.2d at 112, 113.
The parallels between the facts established at the trial
below and the ones in the Horne case, supra, are noteworthy.

-13-
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'The evidence presented hy the Prosecution and Defense in this
case shows that the Prosecutrix and the Defendant were acquain:
so,:ially,

and that the Prosecutrix voluntarily accompanied tr.•

Defendant to his house

(R., 30). This amicable beginning led tr.

these two individuals spending a period of time together whict
resu~ted

in intercourse.

No evidence was presented that

~e

Complainif'c; witness atteIT.pted to escape, or attempted to alert
c.ny neighbors to her supp•Jsedly precarious situation.
of any force vccS minimal. and showed little,

Evi8er. 2,

if any, marks of

any struggle on the Complaining witness's part.

(R., 115, 124;

Upon leaving the residence of the Defendant she did not
immediately report the incident to the police,
home.

instead she wen:

There she was confronted by an irrate husband who had be•

concerned over her delay.

Yet again she failed to disclose

him anything about "the incident",

(R., 49). The next

~

mornings~

did not call the police and she did not tell her husband.
On)y later the next day, after confiding in friends, did she be·
come impressed with the necessity of calling the police,

(R.,8>

Such a delay in reporting "the incident" to the Police
gives rise to the obvious inference of an effort on the part of
U·e Complaining witness to "minimize her fault hy assertinq for:•
of ·. i_ole nee".

Sucr1

.1

rt...,ry is unworthy cf belief upon objectiui

-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~nal;sis,

and reasonable minds could not believe beyond a reason-

alle rloubt that the Defendant herein was guilty of the crimes
charged.
The Horne court quoted from the case of State vs. Williams
180 P. 2d SSl

(Utah, 1947).

There the Supreme Court reversed a

conviction of the Defendant at trial for rape.

The Court stated:

Under such state of the record may the verdict
of guilty be permitted to stand? We think not.
Nevertheless we cannot escape the responsibility
of passing judgment upon whether under the evidence
a jury could, in reason, conclude that the Defendant's guilt was proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
This is not to say that merely by reason
of the fact that the circumstances surrounding an
alleged assault of this nature created a reasonable
doubt in the mind of this court that the offense was
in fact committed, we will set aside a verdict. The
total picture presented by the record here considered
must be kept in mind in evaluating the result here
reached.
180 P.2d at SSS.
The same situation is applicable in the case at bar.

Under

>:c.e facts as presented at trial below reasonable minds simply
could not conclude that Defendant was guilty beyond all
reasonable doubt.

This Court has held that if there is nothing

so inherently incredible about a rape victim's story that
reasonable minds would reject it, a conviction may rest upon the
Complaining Witness's testimony alone.
P. 2d 700

(Utah 1977).

State v. Studham 572

But under the facts established at trial

-15-
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in the case below,
behavior

the Complaining witness's explaination for

is inherently incredible.

There is simply no

explaination for her failure to report the incident until lat,
the next day.

If she was truely as out.raged as she should ha,1,

been had she in fact been forced to engage in the intercourse,
she simply would not have waited that length of time before
reporting the incident.

Since there is no other conclusive

evidence besides the Comolaining witness's testimony th2t she.
not consent to the act of intercourse,

the question is

essentially reduced to whether or not her story is believable,
not.

Defendant asserts that the same rule as regards

circumstantial evidence should apply to this case, that is, a
cor,viction may rest upon such evidence only when the facts are
i ncompa ti hle with the

innocence of the accused by anv reasonabl'

hypothesis, and are incapable of explaination upon any other
reasonable explaination other than the Defendant's guilt.
State vs. Lamb 131 P.2d 805

(Utah, 1942) Since the facts of tt,:'

case obviously establish another equally reasonable explainatic·
besides the Defendant's guilt,
Complaining witness,

that is the consent of the

the Defendant should not be found guilty

upon such evidence alone.
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B.
The errors committed at trial below sub
stant1ally preJudiced the Defendant's right
to a fair trial.
Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah Code
Annolated,

1953, Section 77-35-30, as amended, provides in part:
(a)
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not effect the substantial rights of
a party shall be disregarded.

Defendant submits that the errors committed at the trial

below had a substantial and prejudicial effect on the Defendant's
right to a fair trial.
In State vs. Howard 544 P.2d 466

(Utah, 1975)

this court

··3cated the Defendant's conviction of rape and remanded the case
for

a new tr ia 1.

bet~een

The evidence established that the association

the parties came about in a friendly and peaceful manner

ana the al1egation by the Complaining witness of a transition

into violence raised a genuine and critical issue as to her
consent.

Because the trial court excluded proffered evidence

about the Complaining witness's reputation and moral character
the Supreme Court found there may have been a different result
haa such evidence been allowed at trial.

The Court stated the

test for determining whether or not an error was prejudicial as

follows:
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1_1,)nn

.ipr)~ars

bf~\onc1

l.~)nkino

a

a·- th~ w,1<".>'~,~
r€-as0;;ablc rL,Jubt

'-'\l-l(lenc~

thZJ.t

i_t

tlli:>f<?

is :-'O suti~;tc,n·ial li!<elihood ~11:-.t thP vet<1iC't
\·.'cul·:'l ha?e LPPn cli ff<>rert in tt··e absenc,o of the
it shoulcl be disreoarrle:•d.

C'rror,

Bu'

·~he>

re'JPtSE

ti or:i_i :o a 1 so true:
that i ftlore_i_s_il __
reasonable likelihood that in the ·absence -c;T-the
error, there would have been a flifferent. result,
the error should be reqarded as pre1ud1c1al.
(Emphasis added) 544 P.2d 468, 469.

~~-i

Had the trial court in the case at bar maintained a prope:.
neutral attitude towards the Defendant and had the Prosecutor
u:frained from commenting upon the duty the jury had to the
victim in the alleged crime, there is a substantial

likeliho~

that the jury would have reached a different result, and
acquitted Defendant on both counts.

Therefore Defendant is

2ntltlPd to a new trial for these alleged crimes.
In State vs.
rev~rsed

Eaton 569 P. 2d 114

(Utah, 1977) this couit

the Defendant's conviction that trial for the

d;;c".'ibuti::rn for value of a controlled substance.
hac!

2r;i:.ea]

ed his conviction 0n grounds that, amor·g other thing<,

t ;,., Pro<i8CUt ion

t11.':

't'he Defendar.:

had made oblique but imperrni ssible references tc

failure of the Defendant to testify in his own behalf.

Accepting the proposition that the remarks
complained of were improper, the question of
more orave concern is whether, in the light
of th~ total picture as presented in this case,
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Th

0

that impropriety should be regarded as prejudicial error and justify reversal of the
conviction.
We note our awareness that there
should be no such reversal merely to criticise
a Prosecutor who, perhaps in the ardor of
advocacy in the trial, oversteps the bounds of
propriety, nor merely because error has been
committed.
Consistant with the nature of criminal
proceedings and the protections accorded those
accussed of crime under our law, including the
presumption of innocence and the burden of the
State to prove the Defendant's guilt bevond a
reasonable doubt, we believe that, on appeal,
when there is reasonable doubt as to whether the
error below was preiudicial, that doubt should be
resolved in favor of the Defendant. (Emphasis added)
569 P.2d at 116.
Because the error was sufficient to justify the reasonable
belief that it had a substantial effect adverse to the Defendant's right to a fair trial, the error was not regarded as
harmless.

So too,

in the instant case, there is a reasonable

likelihood that in the absence of the prejudicial statements by
the trial judge and the Prosecutor the jury would not have been
able to come to a verdict of guilty.

CONCLUSION
Because the facts in this case lend themselves just as
easily to a conclusion that the Complaining witness consented
ro sexual intercourse as they do to the conclusion that she did
not consent, the improper statements made by the trial court and
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the Prosecutor must be presumed prejudicial.

The facts as

established at trial are simply insufficient by themselves to
support a conviction of the Defendant for rape and forcible
sodomy.

Therefore the errors at trial should be found by this

court to be grounds for reversal of the Defendant's conviction.
both counts, and the case remanded for a new trial.

;!-
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